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BACK FROM THE BRINK
Hon. Leon D. Lazer:
Our next speaker will be dealing with the area of the First
Amendment. 1 As far as the number of cases, at least, there was
no shortage of First Amendment cases, and no shortage of impor-
tant First Amendment cases. Professor Joel Gora is a very distin-
guished authority in this area. He is a professor at the Brooklyn
Law School and currently general counsel to the New York
American Civil Liberties Union. Professor Gora was national
staff counsel to the ACLU from 1969 to 1978 and he was the pro
se clerk at the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. He is also the
co-author of a book entitled "The Right to Protest." 2 So it is my
pleasure to introduce to you Professor Joel Gora.
Professor Joel M. Gora:
Thank you, Judge Lazer. To paraphrase Mark Twain, last
year's reports of the death of the First Amendment were greatly
exaggerated. 3 When I was privileged to speak about the Court's
First Amendment cases at this symposium a year ago, my dis-
cussion was titled the "First Amendment on the Brink."4 I
gloomily reported that the Court's 1991 Term had been skeptical
about free speech. 5 This year I have a different title. It is either
"away from the edge," "back from the brink," "away from the
abyss," or concepts of that kind. Surprisingly, this past Term was
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides: "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances." Id.
2. JOEL M. GORA, THE RIGHT TO PROTEST (1991).
3. JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 625 (15th rev. ed. 1980).
Mark Twain (Samuel Langhorne Clemens) wrote in a cable from London to
the Associated Press that "the reports of my death are greatly exaggerated."
Id.
4. See Joel M. Gora, On the Brink" The First Amendment in the
Rehnquist Court, 1990-91 Tenn, 9 TOURO L. REv. 111 (1992).
5. See generally id. at 111-17.
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a very good year for First Amendment claimants. 6 The First
Amendment, which had seemed so vulnerable the previous year,
proved remarkably resilient this past Term. 7
When I hear remarks like those from my former colleague at
the ACLU, Janet Benshoof,8 or hear discussions about books
concerning how Chief Justice Rehnquist is seeking to and suc-
ceeding in bringing about his agenda of change at the Supreme
Court,9 I feel a little guilty. At least on the issues I keep track of,
constitutional rights still have not been vanquished and we are not
in a constitutional crisis.
The 1992 Term heard ten cases involving First Amendment is-
sues, 10 nine on the constitutional side,11 and one parallel case
dealing with free speech rights under a federal statute. 12 For the
box score types among you, the First Amendment assertion pre-
6. See infra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
7. 61 U.S.L.W. 3043 (U.S. Aug. 4, 1992).
8. See generally Janet Benshoof, Pennsylvania's Abortion Case, 9 TOURO
L. REv. 217 (1993).
9. DAVID SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST
COURT 412-13, 451-58 (1992); see also DONALD E. BOLES, MR. JUSTICE
REHNQUIST, JUDICIAL ACTIVIST 120-21, 123, 127-30 (1987); DEREK DAVIS,
ORIGINAL INTENT: CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST AND THE COURSE OF AMERICAN
CHURCH/STATE RELATIONS Xvii, 83-85, 128-29, 156 (1991); CHARLES M.
LAMB & STEPHEN C. HALPERN, THE BURGER COURT 322-23, 337 (1991).
10. Lee v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 112 S. Ct. 2709
(1992); Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992); Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct.
2395 (1992); Burdick v. Takushi, 112 S. Ct. 2059 (1992); Burson v.
Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992); Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S. Ct. 1093
(1992); Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992); Norman v. Reed,
112 S. Ct. 698 (1992); Simon & Schuster v. New York Crime Victims Bd.,
112 S. Ct. 501 (1991).
11. Lee v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 112 S. Ct. 2709
(1992); Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992); Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct.
2395 (1992); Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992); Dawson v.
Delaware, 112 S. Ct. 1093 (1992); Norman v. Reed, 112 S. Ct. 698 (1992):
Simon & Schuster v. New York Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991).
12. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992).
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vailed in six cases, 13 was unsuccessful in three, 14 and split the
difference in the tenth. 15 That is a .650 batting average, which is
pretty good in any league.
The Term was marked by a number of interesting develop-
ments. There were several cases where the Court really got down
to basics about First Amendment doctrines. 16 If there is any
theme that I think most captures the cases this year, it is this:
"regulations which permit the Government to discriminate on the
basis of the content of the message cannot be tolerated under the
First Amendment."17 That is a quote from a Supreme Court case
decided in the early 1980s,18 and it appeared three or four times
as a bellwether capturing the Court's sentiment on these issues
this Term. 19 No government discrimination can be based on the
desire to censor the message. 20
13. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992); Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct.
2395 (1992); Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S. Ct. 1093 (1992); Norman v. Reed,
112 S. Ct. 698 (1992); Simon & Schuster v. New York Crime Victims Bd.,
112 S. Ct. 501 (1991).
14. Burdick v. Takushi, 112 S. Ct. 2059 (1992); Burson v. Freeman, 112
S. Ct. 1846 (1992); Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992).
15. Lee v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 112 S. Ct. 2709
(1992).
16. See Lee v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 112 S. Ct.
2709 (1992) (public forum doctrine); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct.
2538 (1992) (content based restrictions); Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846
(1992) (public forum doctrine and content based restrictions).
17. Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1984), quoted in Simon
& Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 508.
18. Regan, 468 U.S. at 648-49.
19. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2542; Forsyth, 112 S. Ct. at 2404; Burson, 112
S. Ct at 1858.
20. See Forsyth, 112 S. Ct. at 2401 (holding permit schemes controlling
time, place, and manner of speech must not be content-based); Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) ("[W]e cannot indulge the facile
assumption that one can forbid particular words without also running a
substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process."); New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964) ("[C]onstitutional protection does not
turn upon 'the truth, popularity or social utility of the ideas which are
offered.'") (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1962)).
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Another interesting development is that Justice Souter is start-
ing to emerge as a significant swing Justice on First Amendment
matters, 2 1 and approaches them with a kind of balanced perspec-
tive that is reminiscent of Justice Harlan. 22 Even more interesting
in terms of Court watching has been Justice Anthony Kennedy.
He has emerged as the Court's most vigorous advocate of the
21. In the following recent cases, Justice Souter's vote was dispositive in
breaking four to four ties existing between the other eight Justices, thereby
forming the majority opinion: Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2652 (1992);
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2541 (1992); Forsyth County v.
Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct. 2395, 2398 (1992); Barnes v. Glen Theatre,
Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2458 (1991); Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1764
(1991).
22. See International Soc'y For Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 112 S. Ct.
2711, 2724-25 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring) (defining "public forum"
inquiry as necessarily specific to each particular property, but dissenting as to
the Court's upholding of overall ban on solicitation of funds in New York City
airports); Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2676-77 (1992) (Souter, J.,
concurring) (pointing out that in order for non-sectarian prayer at public
school graduation to be accommodated under the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment, omission of prayer must be shown to burden students'
religious beliefs); see also Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513,
2522-23 (1991) (Souter, J., dissenting). In Cohen, the Court held that the First
Amendment did not prohibit a publisher's confidential source from recovering
damages against the publisher who breached a promise not to reveal his
source's identity. Id. at 2516. Justice Souter's dissent argued that the majority
should have used a balancing approach. "I find it necessary to articulate,
measure, and compare the competing interests involved in any given case to
determine the legitimacy of burdening constitutional interests. ... " Id. at
2522 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter also applied a balancing test in his
concurring opinion in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991),
which held a public indecency statute applicable to nude dancers did not
violate First Amendment, in which he weighed the state's interests against
First Amendment rights. Id. at 2468 (Souter, J., concurring). Comparatively,
Justice Harlan used a balancing test in Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576,
590-91 (1969) (holding that governmental interests in punishing words uttered
in contempt of American flag did not outweigh appellant's First Amendment
right to use such words). See also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26
(1971) (Justice Harlan writing for the majority, held that governmental
interests in protecting people in public places from being exposed to
subversive and objectionable speech did not outweigh appellant's First
Amendment right to wear a jacket bearing an expletive in a Los Angeles
courthouse).
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fullest protection of First Amendment rights. 23 This Term, a few
of his opinions reminded me of those of Justice Brennan 24 or the
late Justice Black.25
Finally, by way of introduction, the Court's commitment to
First Amendment rights, or its willingness to protect First
Amendment rights, was particularly tested in two cases involving
very delicate issues: first, the question of banning hate speech, 26
and second, the question of allowing prayers at public school
23. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2566 (1992) (Justice Kennedy,
writing for the majority, held that nonsectarian prayer at public school
graduation was forbidden by Establishment Clause of First Amendment); Lee
v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 112 S. Ct. 2709, 2713
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (agreed with Court's finding that airports are
public forums and that distribution of literature was speech protected by First
Amendment, but concluded that ban on solicitation of funds was a permissible
time, place, and manner restriction); Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 11 S. Ct.
2720, 2735 (1991) ("[T]he First Amendment does not permit suppression of
speech because of its power to command assent .... "); Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397, 420-21 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (agreed with Justice
Brennan that burning of American flag is speech protected by First
Amendment, but expressed distaste at result).
24. See Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62 (1990) (Justice
Brennan, writing for the majority, holding that subjecting public employees to
employment decisions based upon their political beliefs and associations
violated First Amendment rights); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310
(1990) (Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, holding that Flag Burning
Act was subject to most exacting scrutiny and violated First Amendment
protection of expressive conduct).
25. See United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576 (1971)
(Justice Black, writing for the majority, holding that state court decision
enjoining union from furnishing legal advice to members violated First
Amendment by interfering with their right to cooperate in helping each other
to obtain competent and affordable legal representation); Baird v. State Bar of
Ariz., 401 U.S. 1 (1971) (Justice Black, writing for the majority, holding that
Bar applicant was protected by First Amendment principles from being
required to divulge whether she had ever been a member of the Communist
Party).
26. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (holding bias
speech crime ordinance facially invalid).
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graduation ceremonies. 2 7 I will talk about these two cases a little
later. Both cases required the Court to discharge its difficult
constitutional duty of requiring the majority's desires to yield to
the minority's rights. In both cases, the Court honored its highest
tradition.
I. CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
Simon & Schuster v. New York Crime Victims Board
Of the ten cases decided last Term concerning the First
Amendment, two of them dealt with crime and punishment. 2 8
The first one was Simon & Schuster v. New York Crime Victims
Board.29 It was a New York case and, of course, it involved the
challenge to the so-called Son of Sam law. 30
You will recall that "Son of Sam" was the press nickname
given to David Berkowitz, a serial killer who terrorized New
York in the summer of 1977.31 In order to prevent Berkowitz
and others like him from reaping a financial windfall from selling
the rights to their grisly stories while the victims went uncompen-
sated, 32 the New York legislature required that income of an ac-
cused or convicted person derived from telling the stories of the
crimes would, in effect, be escrowed for five years and made
available for compensating victims.33 The forfeiture escrow pro-
vision of the New York statute was triggered by entrance into any
contract with a criminal for the "re-enactment" of the crime, or
27. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (holding that even
nonsectarian prayers by clergyman were impermissible at public school
graduation ceremonies).
28. Simon & Schuster v. New York Crime Victims Rd., 112 S. Ct. 501
(1991); Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S. Ct. 1093 (1992).
29. 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991).
30. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 1982).
31. Simon & Shuster, 112 S. Ct. at 504.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 505; N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1) (McKinney 1982).
[Vol 9256
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"expression" of the perpetrator's "thoughts, feelings, opinions or
emotions regarding such crime."34
The law was never applied to Berkowitz because he never stood
trial.35 But it was sought to be applied to Simon & Schuster, the
publisher of a book called Wiseguy.36 Wiseguy was about the ex-
ploits of Henry Hill, a fabulously successful professional crimi-
nal.3 7 You are probably more familiar with the story when it be-
came a box office smash movie called Goodfellas. The New York
State Crime Victims Board contacted Simon & Schuster and
sought to escrow the funds. 38 Simon & Schuster resisted and
filed suit.39 A divided Second Circuit panel upheld the Son of
Sam statute,40 but the Supreme Court unanimously reversed. 4 1
34. N.Y. EXEC. LAw 632-a(1) (McKinney 1982) provides in pertinent
part:
Every person... contracting with any person or the representative or
assignee of any person, accused or convicted of a crime in this state,
with respect to the reenactment of such crime, by way of a movie, book,
magazine article, tape recording, phonograph record, radio or television
presentation, live entertainment of any kind, or from the expression of
such accused or convicted person's thoughts, feelings, opinions or
emotions regarding such crime, shall submit a copy of such contract to
the board and pay over to the board any moneys which would
otherwise, by terms of such contract, be owing to the person so accused
or convicted or his representatives. The board shall deposit such moneys
in an escrow account for the benefit of and payable to any victim or the
legal representative of any victim of crimes committed by: (i) such
convicted person: or (ii) by such accused person, but only if such
accused person is eventually convicted of the crime and provided that
such victim, within five years of the date of the establishment of such
escrow account, brings a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction
and recovers a money judgment for damages against such person or his
representatives.
Id.
35. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 506.
36. Id.; NICHOLAS PILEGGI, WISEGUY: LIFE IN A MAFIA FAMILY (1986)
[hereinafter WISEGUY].
37. See generally WISEGUY.
38. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 507.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 508 (citing Simon & Schuster v. Fishetti, 916 F.2d 777 (2d Cir.
1990)).
41. Id. at 512.
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Justice O'Connor wrote this opinion and spoke for six Jus-
tices. 42 She found that the applicable constitutional cornerstones
were clear. 43 First, a statute is presumptively invalid if it imposes
a financial burden on speakers because of the content of their
speech. 44 Second, this is a reflection of the larger "no censor-
ship" principle that the government may not try to drive certain
ideas or certain viewpoints from the marketplace of ideas. 45 She
evoked memories, of course, of the great Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, originator of the concept of the "free market of
ideas. "46
Moreover, she pointed out, preventing government from dictat-
ing the terms of public discussion and penalizing those who speak
certain words also served to further individual liberty. It meant
people, rather than government, would be deciding the basic is-
sues of what should be said and what should be heard. 4 7 She
found that the Son of Sam escrow forfeiture statute ran afoul of
these principles because only certain kinds of speech were singled
out for control. 48 It was basically a content-based provision. 49
First, it only captured a criminal's income from certain activi-
ties. 50 It did not capture income from clipping coupons, instead
capturing only income from expressive activities. 51 Second, of
the expressive activity, only a description of the crime would
42. Id. at 504. Justice Thomas did not participate in the decision of this
case.
43. Id. at 508 (citing Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438, 1444
(1991)).
44. Id. (citing Leathers, I11 S. Ct. at 1443-44).
45. Id. (citing Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1444).
46. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
47. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. 508 (citing Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at
1444-45); see Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
48. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 508.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.; N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1) (McKinney 1982).
258 [Vol 9
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cause the proceeds to be subject to the statute. 52 A Son of Sam
cookbook would escape statutory regulation. The Supreme Court
basically said the penalty, the escrow, and the potential confisca-
tion of funds, were invoked solely on the expression of ideas or
the re-enactment of the crime.53 Therefore, it was a classic case
of content-based regulation and presumptively defective for that
reason.
54
The Court did not find that such content-based restriction was
automatically a basis for invalidating the statute. 55 Content-based
censorship does not per se invalidate a statute. Instead, the Court
required the government to try to justify and sustain the statute by
showing that the content-based discrimination was necessary to
serve a compelling state interest, and that the statute was nar-
rowly drawn to achieve that end. 56
This compelling interest test is a familiar staple of constitu-
tional law, requiring courts to assess the gravity of the law's ob-
jectives and the precision with which the law achieves any objec-
tives found to be compelling. 57 The Court looked at the objec-
tives that were posited by New York and found the only valid
interest was in providing a way to compensate victims of crime
from the fruits of the crime.58 However, that interest was not
directly served by this law because the law regulated speech in
too sweeping a fashion. 59 The state had "little if any interest in
limiting such compensation to the proceeds of the wrongdoer's
speech about the crime." 60 In other words, the state had no valid
52. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 505; see N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1)
(McKinney 1982).
53. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 508; see N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1)
(McKinney 1982).
54. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 508.
55. Id. at 509.
56. Id. (citing Arkansas Writers' Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231
(1987)).
57. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972); Kramer v.
Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626-27 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
58. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 509.
59. ld. at 511.
60. Id.
19931 259
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interest in punishing the wrongdoer for telling his story beyond
its valid interest in compensating the victim. Moreover, even
though the latter interest was concededly compelling, the law was
found defective because it did not pursue that objective in a
carefully limited fashion. 61 If a description of a crime occupied
one page of a five-hundred page book, the entire book was con-
scripted by the statute. 62 Likewise, even if the crime revealed
had never been the basis of formal accusation, the proceeds of the
book were subject to escrow. 63 The law was struck down, essen-
tially, because it failed to serve a valid interest in any direct or
precise way. 64
I want to spend a moment talking about the compelling interest
test because Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion, spoke
about it at some length. 65 Many First Amendment cases are won
by use of the type of compelling interest test analysis that was
employed by Justice O'Connor in the "Son of Sam" case. 66
However, the formula has been criticized as ultimately unprotec-
tive of First Amendment rights because it gives courts too much
flexibility to try to balance those rights away. 67 In his concurring
opinion, Justice Kennedy criticized the majority's use of the bal-
ancing formula inherent in the compelling interest test. 68 He ar-
gued that the use of the compelling interest test in First Amend-
61. Id.
62. Id. at 511-12.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 512.
65. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
66. See, e.g., Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62 (1990)
(patronage practices affecting promotions, transfers, and recalls following
layoffs were not sufficiently narrowly tailored to further government interests);
Arkansas Writers' Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987) (state failed
to show that its discriminatory tax scheme was necessary to serve compelling
state interest and narrowly tailored to serve such end); Democratic Party of the
United States v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 105 (1981) (state failed to show
compelling state interest for imposition of voting requirements upon those who
later become delegates).
67. E.g., Rosen v. Brown, 970 F.2d 169, 175 (6th Cir. 1992); Mark
Conrad, The Demise of New York's Son of Sam Law - the Supreme Court
Upholds Convicts' Rights to Sell Their Stories, N.Y. B.J. (Mar./Apr. 1992).
68. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 512 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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ment cases came about by accident, and further, that the test "has
no real or legitimate place"69 when the question presented to the
Court concerns the constitutionality of a state restriction on
speech which is based solely on its content. 70 It is Justice
Kennedy's position that, if a law restricts speech solely by the
content of the speech, it is per se unconstitutional unless it falls
within one of the few categories of speech in which some form of
content-based regulation has been either permitted, or at least
considered - obscenity, 71 defamation, 72 fighting words, 73 or the
like. Therefore, in his view, in the case at hand, the fact that the
government was picking out speech, solely because of its content,
and the content did not fall within one of those few off limits ar-
eas of speech, that should have, as he puts it, "end[ed] the mat-
ter."74
I should note parenthetically, the New York legislature, this
past summer, altered the Son of Sam statute considerably. 75 The
new law treats profits from First Amendment activities no differ-
ently from any other activities of the wrongdoer and makes them
available across the board rather than only on the basis of engag-
ing in speech about the crime.76
69. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
70. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
71. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
72. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
73. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
74. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 513 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
75. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 618 (McKinney 1992). The amended statute
provides in pertinent part:
2(a) Every person, firm, corporation, partnership, association or other
legal entity which knowingly contracts for, pays, or agrees to pay, any
profit from a crime, as defined in subdivision one of this section, to a
person charged with or convicted of that crime shall give written notice
to the crime victims board of the payment, or obligation to pay as soon
as practicable after discovering that the payment or intended payment is
a profit from a crime.
(b) The board, upon receipt of notice of a contract, an agreement to pay
or payment of profits of the crime shall notify all known victims of the
crime of the existence of such profits at their last known address.
Id.
76. Id.
19931 261
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Dawson v. Delaware
The other law and order, crime and punishment case is Dawson
v. Delaware.77 It involved the interesting problem of whether
otherwise protected First Amendment activity can be admitted
into evidence on issues of guilt or innocence or punishment. 78
The First Amendment prevailed in this case, but really on very
narrow grounds. 79
Dawson, an escaped prisoner, was convicted for the brutal
murder of an elderly woman shortly after his escape from
prison. 80 At the sentencing phase of the case, the district attorney
was allowed to tell the jury that while in prison, Dawson had
been associated with the Aryan Brotherhood and that the Aryan
Brotherhood was a white racist prison gang. 8 1 The state argued
that evidence of the kind of groups a person belonged to is rele-
vant to his character82 and that it was relevant to sentencing, and
therefore was properly admitted. 83 Dawson claimed that under
the First Amendment, evidence about a defendant's protected ac-
tivities and speech should never be admissible because that would
be a penalty on those activities. 84
77. 112 S. Ct. 1093 (1992).
78. Id. at 1097.
79. Id. at 1098. The court concluded that disclosure of association was
permissible during sentencing proceedings. In this particular case, however,
the stipulation rendered the Aryan Brotherhood evidence irrelevant. Id. at
1097.
80. Id. at 1095.
81. Id. at 1096.
82. See United States v. Sickles, 524 F. Supp. 506, 510 (Del. 1981),
aff'd, 688 F.2d 827 (3d Cir. 1982) (participation in Ku Klux Klan relevant
character evidence).
83. Dawson, 112 S. Ct. at 1096.
84. Id. at 1097. See also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116 (1982)
(holding that evidence of emotional and mental development of 16 year old
convicted of killing a police officer were relevant "mitigating factors" to be
considered in sentencing); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)
(holding character evidence relevant in evaluating whether a convicted
murderer should not receive death penalty); DEL. CODE ANN. ch. 11,
262 [Vol 9
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By an 8-1 vote, 85 the Court rejected both of those broad posi-
tions. 86 Chief Justice Rehnquist said that First Amendment pro-
tected activities have been held to be admissible into evidence in
criminal cases where they were directly relevant to one of the is-
sues. 87 For example, in a murder case, 88 evidence that the de-
fendant was an advocate of race warfare between the races was
admissible to show character in terms of punishment. 89
Similarly, evidence that a defendant was a member of the Ar-
yan Brotherhood in prison had been held admissible in another
case 90 to impeach a witness, who himself was also a member of
the Aryan Brotherhood, by showing that the group has, as one of
its planks, that its members will always lie to protect one an-
other. 91 Introducing that evidence, and showing the link between
the witness' membership in the group and the defendant's mem-
bership in the group, was found to be a valid way to undermine
the credibility of that particular witness. 92
The Court concluded that the Constitution did not prevent the
admission of evidence concerning one's beliefs and associations
at sentencing simply because those beliefs and associations were
otherwise protected by the First Amendment. 93 Finally, and this
was the Court's specific point, the evidence must be directly
relevant. 94 In this case, the defendant was a member of a white
§ 4209(a)(1) (1989) (holding character as a relative determinant when
imposing the death sentence).
85. Dawson, at 1095. The dissenting Justice was Justice Thomas.
86. Id. at 1097-99.
87. E.g., United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984) (holding evidence of
membership in the Aryan Brotherhood and the organization's plank that
members must lie for one another admissible for impeachment of witness);
Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983) (holding defendant's desire to start a
race war admissible in death penalty sentencing phase of case).
88. See Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983) (moral, factual, and legal
judgment play a proper role in sentencing).
89. Id. at 949.
90. United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984).
91. Id at 48.
92. Id. at 49; see FED. R. EVID. 608(b).
93. Dawson, 112 S. Ct. at 1097.
94. Id. at 1097-98.
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racist group. 95 The victim of his crime was a white person also,
leaving no question of racial hostility in the commission of the
crime. 96 There was no evidence of illegal activity by the
group. 97 The Supreme Court essentially said there was no proba-
tive weight to this information about his membership in this
white, racist prison gang and allowing the jury to consider it in
the death penalty phase was a violation of the First Amend-
ment. 98
There are two interesting things to note about this case. I do
not think this case has widespread ramifications. First, with re-
spect to the hate speech problem and the issue of whether bias-
motivated crime or sentencing laws are still valid, the Dawson
case suggests they are. 99 There was one dissenter, and that was
Justice Clarence Thomas. 100 This was one of his first cases after
he was appointed to the Court, 10 1 and it provided him with an
opportunity to take a very tough law-and-order stance. What he
essentially said was if the defendant was entitled to prove he was
a member of the Boy Scouts to show his good character, the
prosecutor could introduce membership in the Aryan Brotherhood
to demonstrate the contrary. 102
Finally, Justice Thomas said this was not a First Amendment
case at all. 103 He stated that if there are any outer limits on the
kinds of evidence of activities and speech that can be admissible
in a criminal proceeding, those limits come from the Due Process
95. Id. at 1096.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1097. The Supreme Court has recently agreed to hear such a
"bias-motivated" crime case. See infra notes 351-55. We will see how Dawson
fares in that context.
100. Dawson, 112 S. Ct. at 1100 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
101. Justice Thomas joined the Court on October 18, 1991. He also
authored Molzf v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 711 (1992), Lechmere, Inc. v.
NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992), and a concurring opinion in White v. Illinois,
112 S. Ct. 736 (1992).
102. Dawson, 112 S. Ct. at 1101 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 1104 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Clause, 10 4 but they do not come from the First Amendment. 105
However, the Court itself found a First Amendment violation by
introducing evidence of one's First Amendment activities where
that evidence was not directly probative of the issues in the
case. 10 6
II. ELECTORAL PROCESS
The next group of cases deal with the First Amendment and the
electoral process.107 Here you have the constitutional rights of
candidates, voters, and political activists pitted against the state's
regulation of the electoral process. Two of the cases involved
control of the ballot and whose name gets to be on it.10 8 The
third case dealt with state regulation of access to the area around
polling places where ballots are kept. 109 In this area, the First
Amendment claimants were largely unsuccessful. 110
104. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, cl. 1.
105. Dawson, 112 S. Ct. at 1104 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 1098.
107. Burdick v. Takushi, 112 S. Ct. 2059 (1992) (holding Hawaii's
prohibition on write-in voting does not unreasonably burden voting rights
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments); Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct.
1846 (1992) (holding Tennessee statute preventing electioneering within 100
feet of polls survived First Amendment scrutiny); Norman v. Reed, 112 S. Ct.
698 (1992) (holding disparate requirements for establishment of new political
parties violate First and Fourteenth Amendments).
108. Burdick, 112 S. Ct. 2059 (1992); Norman, 112 S. Ct. 698 (1992).
109. Burson, 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992).
110. Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2067-68 (holding laws prohibiting write-in
voting will be presumptively valid when burdens imposed on First and
Fourteenth Amendments were reasonable); Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1857-58
(holding law requiring campaign solicitors to refrain from distributing
campaign materials within 100 feet of a polling area does not infringe on First
Amendment rights); Norman, 112 S. Ct. at 708 (holding law requiring 25,000
signatures for new political party to get on ballot violated First and Fourteenth
Amendments).
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Norman v. Reed
The first of the three cases is Norman v. Reed.111 It involved
the requirements for getting a new political party on the ballot in
Chicago and Cook County. 112 The law in this area is quite set-
tled, the Court said, and it described the relevant principles:
The constitution protects the right of citizens to create and de-
velop new political parties. That right derives from the first and
fourteenth amendment and advances the constitutional interests
of like-minded voters to gather in pursuit of common political
ends, thus enlarging the opportunity of all voters to express their
own political preferences. To the degree that the state would
thwart this interest by limiting the access of new parties to the
ballot, we have called for the demonstration of a corresponding
interest sufficiently weighted to justify the limitation. And we
have accordingly required any severe restrictions to be narrowly
drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance. 113
Well, again, this is a variation of the compelling interest
test. 114 The case involved Chicago and Cook County politics and
efforts of the Harold Washington Party (HWP) to expand to the
Cook County suburbs. 115 Election officials claimed that the Cook
County party could not use the HWP name because that belonged
to the Chicago city party. 116 In addition, officials insisted that
the new party, in order to run in districts that encompassed both
the City of Chicago and areas of the suburbs within Cook
County, had to get 25,000 petition signatures in Chicago and an-
other 25,000 in the suburban areas, even though to run statewide
all that was needed was a cap of 25,000 signatures. 117
111. 112 S. Ct. 698 (1992).
112. Id. at 702.
113. Id. at 705 (citing Illinois Election Bd. v. Socialist Workers Party, 440
U.S. 173, 184, 186 (1979)).
114. Id. at 705.
115. Id. at 702.
116. Id. at 702-03.
117. Id. at 702; see ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 46, §10-2 (1989).
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The Supreme Court, by a 7-1 margin, held most of these re-
strictions invalid under the neo-compelling interest analysis de-
scribed a moment ago. 118 First, while states may regulate the use
of the political party names and designations in order to prevent
fraud on the voters, in this instance such regulation was unneces-
sary since the new county-wide party had clear authority to use
the HWP designation. 119 Second, requiring more signatures for
local offices than for statewide slots is not a precise way to en-
sure that parties demonstrate substantial voter support before
gaining access to the ballot. 120 In other words, if you want to run
in a suburban district, you need 25,000 signatures there; if you
want to run in the city district, you need 25,000 signatures there;
but if you want to run in a county-wide district that comprises
both, 25,000 is the maximum requirement that can be im-
posed. 12 1 Justice Scalia, the lone dissenter, felt the Illinois rule
was valid in all respects since it was designed to require that par-
ties file a complete slate of candidates in all geographical areas of
the political unit and the signature requirement helps insure that
broad local support. 122
Burdick v. Ta ashi
In Burdick v. Takushi, 123 the Court dealt with a broader elec-
tion law question, and that was the validity of a Hawaii ban on
write-in voting. 124
Six Justices concluded, in an opinion by Justice White, that the
ban was not unconstitutional. 125 A state is not constitutionally re-
quired to provide for the casting, tabulation, and publication of
118. See supra note 113.
119. Norman, 112 S. Ct. at 707.
120. Id. at 708.
121. Id. at 707-08.
122. Id. at 710-11 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
123. 112 S. Ct. 2059 (1992).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 2067-68.
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write-in votes so long as the state's electorate scheme otherwise
affords constitutionally sufficient methods to get on the ballot. 12 6
All Justices agreed that, despite the fundamental importance of
the right to vote, there is no broad First Amendment right to cast
a write-in protest vote, 12 7 not all burdens on the franchise require
strict scrutiny by the courts, 12 8 and the states are given consider-
able leeway in managing their electoral systems. 129 The Justices
were also in unanimous agreement that the Court weighs and
measures the nature and magnitude of the harm to the right to
vote, the precise interests asserted by the state, and the extent to
which there is the need to burden the right to vote in order to
achieve those interests. 130 Obviously, the more severe the burden
on the right to vote, the greater the required justification, and
vice versa.
But the Court was sharply divided over the application of these
principles. For the majority, the injury and burden from the ban
on write-in voting were moderate since Hawaii afforded several
other ways for candidates to get on the ballot and voters to select
them. 131 The majority found that one could get on the ballot by
petitioning, 13 2 by forming a new party, 13 3 or by creating a
separate ballot for Independents. 134 Given all of these other
methods of access, the majority determined that denying the right
to write people's name on the ballot is not unconstitutionally bur-
densome. 135 The majority further found that the state had valid
interests in protecting against the confusion that would come if a
126. Id.; but see Paul v. Indiana Election Bd., 743 F. Supp. 616 (S.D. Ind.
1990) (holding state's ban on write-in voting violation of voter's rights of
association and political expression); Canaan v. Abdelnour, 710 P.2d 268
(Cal. 1985) (striking down city's prohibition against write-in voting in
municipal elections because it violated fundamental right of franchise).
127. Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2066; id. at 2068 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 2063-64; id. at 2069-70 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 2066; id. at 2069 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 2069-70 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 2064-65.
132. Id. at 2064.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 2065.
135. Id.
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loser in a primary were then to mount a write-in campaign in the
general election. 136 In order to prevent that kind of 'sore loser'
write-in approach, the Supreme Court upheld the ban on the
write-in voting. 137 Accordingly, the justifying interests did not
have to be so weighty, and Hawaii's concerns with preventing
'sore-loser' candidacies, for example, a write-in campaign for
Geraldine Ferraro or Elizabeth Holtzman, was sufficient. 138
Justice Kennedy, along with Justices Blackmun and Stevens,
saw a radically different political landscape. 139 To the dissenters,
the ban on write-in voting was designed to perpetuate one-party
rule in a state controlled by the Democratic Party and prevent
effective write-in or insurgent candidates to challenge the party
hacks. 140 Moreover, such a ban was contrary to a long historical
tradition of permitting write-in votes as part of the democratic
process, and served no valid interest. 141
Burson v. Freemnan
The final case concerning electoral rights dealt not so much
with the ballot itself, but the area around the ballot, and the
question of whether you could engage in First Amendment ac-
tivities - handing out leaflets, political discussion - near the
ballot box. Like the Hawaii case, the Supreme Court ruled in fa-
136. Id. at 2066. The Court explained the state interests in regulating write-
in campaigns: avoiding factions in general elections; preserving the general
election, not primaries, as the forum for interparty race; avoiding party
raiding; and preventing circumvention of the state electoral system via
primaries. Id. Other cases have enumerated additional state interests including
voter education, Illinois Elections Bd. v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S.
173, 185 (1979) (assuring the winner of election will be supported by strong
plurality); American Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 782, 785 n.14 (1974)
(avoiding voter confusion); Canaan v. Abdelnour, 710 P.2d 268, 278 (Cal.
1985) (preservation of electoral process and regulating number of candidates).
137. Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2066.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 2068-69 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
140. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 2072 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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vor of government control of the integrity of the electoral process
and against the interests of political activists. 142
The case is Burson v. Freeman. 143 It was a Tennessee case up-
holding a long-standing New York tradition of banning election-
eering within one hundred feet of the polls. 144 We all know the
familiar - I think it's diamond-shaped blue signs that say "no
electioneering within one hundred feet of the polls." 145 It was a
New York invention about a century ago. 146 It was challenged by
a Tennessee campaign worker. 147 Now every state has a barrier
of that kind, a kind of campaign-free zone. 14 8 The Tennessee
Supreme Court threw out the ban, 149 finding the dissemination of
leaflets about a candidate was core political speech. 150 It was in a
142. See Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1858. The century-old New York Law prohibits campaign
speech within 100 feet of the polls on election day. Act of May 2, 1890, ch.
262, 335, 1890 N.Y. Laws 482, 494.
145. 18 Op. Att'y Gen. 245 (1896).
146. See Act of May 18, 1892, ch. 680, art. V, § 102, 1892 N.Y. Laws
1602, 1633 (Banks) which provided in relevant part: "No person shall, while
the polls are open at any polling place, do any electioneering within such
polling place, or within one hundred and fifty feet therefrom in any public
street or room, or in a public manner." The current version of this provision is
codified at N.Y. ELEC. LAW, art. 5, § 204(9) (McKinney 1978 & Supp.
1992).
147. Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1848.
That section reads in pertinent part: "Within the appropriate boundary
as established in subsection (a) [100 feet from the entrances], and the
building in which the polling place is located, the display of campaign
posters, signs or other campaign materials, distribution of campaign
materials, and solicitation of votes for or against any person or political
party or position on a question are prohibited." Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-7-
111(b) (Supp. 1991).
Id.
148. Id. at 1855.
149. Freeman v. Burson, 802 S.W.2d 210, 214 (Tenn. 1990), rev'd, 112
S. Ct. 1846 (1992).
150. See id. at 212, 214; see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct.
2538, 2564 (1992) (core political speech considered to be entitled to highest
First Amendment protection); Lenhert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 111 S. Ct.
1950, 1960-61 (1991) (holding that union's use of service fees for lobbying or
other political activities violated political speech rights at core of First
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classic public forum, right there on the sidewalk. 151 The only
speech that you cannot talk about within that zone is politics. 152
You can talk about commercial speech or anything else. 153 You
just cannot talk about politics. 154 The statute was content-
based 155 and it really did not carefully serve the government's
interest in preventing voter fraud or voter intimidation. 156 For
that reason, the Tennessee Supreme Court held the statute and
ban on politicking within one hundred feet of the polls, not inside
where people vote, but out on the street, violated the First
Amendment. 157
The Supreme Court reversed and upheld the one hundred foot
ban, 158 although the Court was quite divided on this issue. 159 It
was not an easy one. There was a four-Justice plurality opin-
ion 160 written by Justice Blackmun that agreed serious restric-
tions on political activity were going on in this case, 161 but found
that the state had a compelling interest in restricting handing out
Amendment freedoms); Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 420 (1988) (holding
statute prohibiting paying individuals to circulate petitions burdened -core
political speech" and was thus subject to highest First Amendment scrutiny).
151. Freeman, 802 S.W.2d at 212. For further discussion of public forum
analysis, see Lee v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 112 S. Ct.
270 (1992) (holding that airport terminal was not public forum); United States
v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990) (holding that sidewalk on Postal Service
property was not traditional public forum); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (holding that public school was not a
traditional public forum, and state could regulate speech so long as restriction
was reasonable and not an attempt to prevent expression of speaker's
viewpoint).
152. Freeman, 802 S.W.2d at 214.
153. See id. at 212.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 213.
156. id. at 214.
157. Id.
158. Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1858.
159. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun, White, Kennedy, and
Scalia concurred in the judgment. Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Stevens
dissented. Justice Thomas took no part in the decision of the case. Id. at 1848.
160. The plurality opinion written by Justice Blackmun was joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White and Kennedy. Id.
161. Id. at 1850.
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leaflets and engaging in political discussion within one hundred
feet of the poll. 162
One disturbing thing about the case is that the Court purported
to be applying a compelling interest test and did a lot of breast
beating about how seriously we take First Amendment rights. 16 3
But the evidence relied on by the Court was what was going on in
Tammany Hall in New York in 1882.164 Despite the Court's
representations, the measure of scrutiny that was in fact given
was considerably less demanding, and the Court upheld the ban
not because of any evidence of present problems, but because of
history and tradition. 16 5 The latter provided the most current evi-
dence of voter fraud and people being badgered outside the
polls. 166 In fairness to the Court, there were a few episodes in
the twentieth century, 167 but by and large, maybe because there
had been a ban for years in many states, 168 there really was no
evidence that voters were being bribed, buttonholed, harassed, or
intimidated down the block from the entrance to the school where
the voting booths were located. 169 Nonetheless, purporting to
apply the compelling interest test, the Court said this was one of
those rare cases where a restriction on speech would be upheld
because the government had a compelling interest. 170 Justice
Scalia concurred in the result, but not in the reasoning. 17 1 For
162. Id. at 1851.
163. Id. at 1849-51.
164. See generally GUSTAVUS MYERS, THE HISTORY OF TAMMANY HALL
(2d ed. 1971).
165. See Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1852-56.
166. The decision itself describes fraud and corruption during the colonial
period through the nineteenth century. Id. at 1852-54. It did not describe any
twentieth century voter fraud outside the polls.
167. E.g., United States v. Malmay, 671 F.2d 869 (5th Cir. 1982)
(conviction for buying votes in school board election); Lowenstein v. Larkin,
40 A.D.2d 604, 335 N.Y.S.2d 799 (2d Dep't 1972) (overturning primary
election results because there was active campaigning at polling place).
168. Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1855-56.
169. Id. at 1856.
170. Id. at 1857.
171. Id. at 1859-60 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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him, tradition conclusively controlled the matter. 172 Since the
area immediately surrounding the polling place had always been
treated as off-limits for electioneering, it was not a traditional
public forum, and reasonable regulation of access to it was ac-
ceptable. 173
Justice Kennedy likewise concurred, 174 and explained why his
concurrence was not inconsistent with his concurrence in the
"Son of Sam" decision175 where he harshly condemned the rou-
tine use of a compelling interest formula to limit otherwise pro-
tected speech. 176 The difference, he maintained, was that Ten-
nessee was not so much censoring the content of the speech as
protecting another vital constitutional right: the right to vote. 177
The dissenters 178 were not buying any of this. They said the
ban raised concerns of the first magnitude. 179 They said that the
claim that it was necessary in order to protect the integrity of the
electoral process bordered on the absurd. 180 As I noted, the fresh
evils were few and far between. The dissenters said that the
Court's watered-down use of strict scrutiny under the compelling
interest test lifted the burden of proof from the government where
it belonged, 181 and shifted it to the First Amendment challenger,
where it did not belong. 182 Lastly, the dissenters observed,
"[a]lthough we often pay homage to the electoral process, we
must be careful not to confuse sanctity with silence. The hubbub
of campaign workers outside a polling place may be a nuisance,
172. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
173. Id. at 1860 (Scalia, J., concurring).
174. Id. at 1858 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
175. Simon & Schuster v. New York Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501,
512 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
176. Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1858-59 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
177. Id. at 1859 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
178. Justices Stevens, O'Connor, and Souter dissented.
179. Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1861 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 1862 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 1865-66 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent corrected the
majority's analysis by referring to Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342
(1972). In Dunn, the Court articulated that under a strict scrutiny analysis, the
state bears the burden of demonstrating a compelling governmental interest. Id.
182. Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1866 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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but it is also the sound of a vibrant democracy." 183 In this last
regard, I think the dissenters were correct. And I think that is one
consequence of Burson which will go well beyond the election
law area and will have repercussions in other First Amendment
cases as well. If the very weak evidence of voter intimidation and
duress was held to sustain the compelling interest test in this case,
then it is hard to imagine what kind of mild showing of concern
would not be successful. Maybe I am being a little too pessimistic
about that.
Finally, I believe this case reflects the fact that in a couple of
recent cases, the Court had been fairly deferential to legislative
claims that certain kinds of political activities will corrupt or
pollute the political process. 184 But when you remember that it is
politicians in the legislature that are making those claims, I think
scrutiny and not deference should be the order of the day. Just as
war is too important to be left to the generals' control, political
speech is too important to be left to the politicians.
III. TIME, PLACE, AND MANNER
The one hundred foot polling case was an election law case as
well as a time, place and manner case. 185 The case dealt with
restrictions on speech activity triggered by content, but operating
on the basis of where and how your speech goes forward. 18 6 It is
like the old joke that the three most important factors of real es-
tate are location, location, location. This Term the Supreme
Court had three cases dealing with location, location, location. 187
183. Id. at 1866-67 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
184. E.g., Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652
(1990) (restrictions on corporate political activity upheld).
185. Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1850.
186. Id.
187. Lee v. International Soc'y For Krishna Consciousness, 112 S. Ct.
2709 (1992) (holding ban on distribution of literature in Port Authority airport
terminals was valid under First Amendment because it would cause substantial
congestion at airport); Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct.
2395 (1992) (invalidating parade permit license fee scheme); Lechmere, Inc. v.
NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992) (upholding limits on location of labor
organization activity).
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In addition, as I just noted, the Court upheld the one hundred
foot ban in the Tennessee case. 188
Lee v. International Society For Krislma Consciousness
The Court's doctrinally most significant case in this area was
closer to home than Tennessee. 189 It involved the Port Authority
airports - Kennedy, LaGuardia, and Newark - and the efforts
by the Hare Krishna religious group to distribute leaflets and
solicit contributions 190 inside the terminals at those airports. 19 1
They engage in such activities as part of their religious ritual. 192
However, the Port Authority has a rule against repetitious
solicitation of money or distribution of literature in terminal
188. Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1858.
189. The case originated in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York. See Int'l Soc'y For Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 721
F. Supp. 572 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd in part, 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992).
Summary judgment was granted in favor of the Krishnas. Krishna, 721 F.
Supp. at 579. At the appellate level, the Second Circuit affirmed the regulation
prohibiting in-person solicitation of the funds, Int'l Soc'y For Krishna
Consciousness v. Lee, 925 F.2d 576, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1991), aff'd, 112 S. Ct.
2701 (1992), but found that the ban on the distribution of literature was invalid
under the Constitution. Id. at 582, aff'd per curiam sub nom. Lee v. Int'l
Soc'y For Krishna Consciousness, 112 S. Ct. 2709 (1992). The Supreme
Court considered two issues in the case in one opinion, see Int'l Soc'y For
Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992) (exploring whether
airport terminal was public forum under First Amendment and whether
prohibition on the solicitation of funds was constitutional), and considered the
last issue in a separate decision. The Court resolved the final issue in yet
another opinion, see Lee v. Int'l Soc'y For Krishna Consciousness, 112 S. Ct.
2709 (1992) (per curiam) (exploring whether First Amendment invalidated ban
on distribution of literature). The opinions of the concurring and dissenting
Justices were set forth in a distinct and separate decision. See Int'l Soc'y For
Krishna Consciousness, 112 S. Ct. 2711 (1992) [hereinafter Krishna 2].
190. Lee v. Int'l Soc'y For Krishna Consciousness, 112 S. Ct. at 2708-09
(per curiam).
191. Lee v. Int'l Soc'y For Krishna Consciousness, 112 S. Ct. at 2710.
192. International Soc'y For Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 112 S. Ct.
2701 (1992). The "ritual [is] known as Sankirtan, which consists of 'going
into public places, disseminating religious literature, and soliciting funds to
support the religion.'" Id. at 2703 (quoting International Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness v. Lee, 925 F.2d at 577).
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locations. 193 However, the Port Authority has a rule against
repetitious solicitation of money or distribution of literature in
terminal locations. 194 The rule was challenged by the religious
group. 195
The litigation went on for a long, long time, 196 but then a di-
vided panel of the Second Circuit upheld the ban on soliciting for
money but struck down the restriction on the simple distribution
of literature. 197 The Second Circuit got it absolutely right as far
as the Supreme Court was concerned, and they agreed precisely
with the circuit court of appeals and upheld the ban on soliciting
for funds and contributions 198 while invalidating the ban on sim-
ply handing out leaflets and literature. 199
Justice O'Connor was the swing vote on both issues. 200 She
joined one majority to uphold the no fund solicitation ban20 1 but
she joined the other group to strike down the distribution of lit-
erature ban.202 Justice O'Connor took the position that a ban on
193. International Soc'y For Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 721 F. Supp. at
574 n.4 (1991).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 573.
196. Id. The action was first commenced in 1975 against the Port Authority
and its then Superintendent, Walter Lee. Id. Final decision was rendered by
the Supreme Court in 1992.
197. International Soc'y For Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 925 F.2d 576,
577 (1991), aff'd per curiain sub nom. Lee v. International Soc'y For Krishna
Consciousness, 112 S. Ct. 2709 (1992).
198. Lee v. International Soc'y For Krishna Consciousness, 112 S. Ct. at
2709 (per curiam).
199. Id. at 2710 (per curiam).
200. Justice O'Connor concurred, upholding the ban on solicitation of
funds within the Port Authority airport terminals, Krishna 2, 112 S. Ct. 2711
(1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring). She also concurred in the judgment
striking down a ban on the repetitive distribution of printed or written material
within the terminals. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
201. Krishna, 112 S. Ct. at 2703. This ruling was joined by Justices Scalia,
Thomas, White, O'Connor, and Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justices Kennedy,
Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter formed the other basic block.
202. Krishna, 112 S. Ct. at 2710 (per curiam). This ruling was joined by
Justices Blackmun, Kennedy, O'Connor, Souter, and Stevens.
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the distribution of literature was not reasonable20 3 and she joined
the four other Justices to form a dispositive majority on that is-
sue. In her view, since the Port Authority was basically running a
multi-purpose facility, much like a mini-shopping mall, leafleting
was compatible with the location, and a total ban on it was unrea-
sonable. 20 4
The case has significance in two respects. First, it adds to the
question of how you define a public forum. 20 5 The Court has de-
veloped this public forum concept to determine whether a speaker
is presumptively entitled to engage in speech at a certain location,
what kinds of regulations the government can seek to impose, and
the kinds of justifications must be given. The courts have devel-
oped a kind of a tripartite categorization structure. 20 6 Let me just
share the Court's description with you.
First, you have what is referred to as a traditional or a full
public forum. 20 7 This encompasses government property that has
traditionally been available for public expression.20 8 Any restric-
tions on speech in that context are subject to the highest scru-
tiny. 20 9
The second category is a so-called designated public forum. 210
That is an area which had not been used for speech until the
government said now we are going to use it for speech. 211 Once
a government designates an area in that fashion, it becomes just
203. Lee v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 112 S. Ct. at
2711 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
204. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
205. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
206. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37
(1983).
207. See id. at 45. A full public forum is a "plac[e] which by long tradition
or by government fiat ha[s] been devoted to assembly and debate ... ." Id.
208. Id. (streets and parks are "quintessential public forums").
209. Id. (regulations are subject to compelling state interest). For further
discussion of the compelling interest test, see Board of Airport Comm'rs of
Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 573 (1987).
210. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 ("public property which the State has opened for
use by the public as a place for expressive activity").
211. Id.
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like a regular public forum, and the same limits on government
censorship apply.2 12
Finally, all that is remaining is public property other than a
public forum or a dedicated public forum, 2 13 which is referred to
as a nonpublic forum. 2 14 In that context, limitations on expres-
sive activity must only survive a much more limited review. 2 15
The challenged regulation need only be reasonable as long as the
regulation is not an effort to suppress the speaker's activity due to
disagreement with the speaker's view. 2 16
Since there are public forums, designated public forums, and
nonpublic forums, the primary issue is always going to be which
type of forum is concerned. Where it is a nonpublic forum, the
secondary issue is going to be what kind of reasonable restric-
tions may be imposed on the speech. 2 17
On the first question, the Court did not find the terminal areas
at airports to be public forums.2 18 The Supreme Court, by a 5-4
vote,2 19 took a narrow view of what qualifies as a public forum.
The Court said, basically, only places which traditionally or by
primary activity are for speech purposes will be considered a
public forum. 220 The government does not create a public forum
by inaction nor does it create one simply by permitting public ac-
cess.
22 1
Applying these very restrictive tests in regard to what consti-
tutes a public forum, the Court concluded that airport terminals
212. Id. at 46. ("Although a State is not required to indefinitely retain the
open character of a facility, as long as it does so it is bound by the same
standards as apply in traditional public forum.").
213. Id. ("public property which is not by tradition or designation a forum
for public communication").
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 49.
218. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 112 S. Ct.
2701, 2708 (1992).
219. Id. at 2703.
220. Id. at 2705.
221. Id. at 2706.
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were not public forums either by tradition or designation. 222 In-
stead, they were deemed nonpublic forums where regulation of
speech activities only had to survive a reasonableness review.223
As I pointed out, under that test, while the ban on handing out
literature was found to be unreasonable, the ban on solicitation of
funds was found to be reasonable to protect air travelers from
harassment or fraud.224 The four Justices who dissented from the
public forum concept definition were led by Justice Kennedy. 225
This is one of those opinions that marks Justice Kennedy as tak-
ing a robust position on First Amendment issues. 226 He basically
said that in a democracy, people need places to come and meet
and talk with one another about politics and government and
other kinds of things, and it derives not just from the Press
Clause227 or the Speech Clause of the First Amendment, 228 but
from the Assembly Clause as well. 229 The right of the people to
assemble is also part of the concept of the public forum.230
Accordingly, Justice Kennedy would take a very different ap-
proach to define whether a certain location was a public forum.
His approach was: "If the objective physical characteristics of the
property at issue and the actual public access and uses which have
been permitted by the government indicate that expressive activ-
ity would be appropriate and compatible with those uses, the
222. Id. at 2706-07.
223. Id. at 2705-06.
224. Id. at 2704.
225. See Krishna 2, 112 S. Ct. 2711, 2715 (1992). Four Justices, led by
Justice Kennedy, concurred in the judgment, but differed substantially in the
reasoning. Primarily, they differed with respect to the public forum principles
as enumerated and applied by the majority.
226. See infra note 385 and accompanying text.
227. Krishna 2, 112 S. Ct. at 2716-17 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see U.S.
CONsT. amend. I, cl. 4 ("Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the
freedom..- of the press").
228. Krishna 2, 112 S. Ct. at 2716-17; see U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 3
("Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech").
229. Krishna 2, 112 S. Ct. at 2716-17; see U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 5
("Congress shall make no law.., abridging.., the right of the people
peaceably to assemble").
230. Krishna 2, 112 S. Ct. at 2716-17 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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property is a public forum." 231 Since it is not incompatible to
hand out leaflets in a busy airport where people are selling beer
and lobsters and everything else, that is a public forum where
speech can go forward. 232
Applying these full public forum principles, Justice Kennedy
would strike the ban on distribution and sale of literature, but al-
low the limitation on solicitation and receipt of funds.233 Justices
Souter, Blackmun, and Stevens would go further and invalidate
the ban on solicitation of funds as well, finding that it was not
narrowly tailored to the objective of protecting against fraud and
duress, both of which can be banned directly. 234
Therefore, the difference between the majority and the dis-
senters on that issue is that the majority basically looks to tradi-
tion and government action to decide whether a place is a robust
public forum for speech activity, 235 whereas the dissenters would
look to a test of incompatibility. 236 In a public place, where
people gather, you are entitled to gather there for speech unless
there is something incompatible between your speech and the
functions of the place. 237 The dissenters felt that nothing incom-
patible could be shown between handing out leaflets or soliciting
funds and the multipurpose uses of Newark, Kennedy, and
LaGuardia airport terminals. 238
Although the result in this case constitutes a one-half victory
for the First Amendment position, the majority's narrow defini-
tion of a public forum was too grudging and inhospitable. There
was a parallel ruling in a statutory setting, in a case where the
Court took a similarly restrictive approach to the question of
whether union organizers could use the parking lot of an em-
ployer-owned shopping center to hand out union literature.
231. Id. at 2718 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
232. Id. at 2719 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
233. Id. at 2715 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
234. Id. at 2725-26 (Souter, J., dissenting).
235. Lee v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 112 S. Ct. at
2706-07.
236. Krishna 2, 112 S. Ct. at 2724 (Souter, J., concurring).
237. Id. at 2725 (Souter, J., concurring).
238. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
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Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB
The statutory case dealing with the locus of speech was Lech-
mere, Inc. v. NLRB. 239 The basic question in this case was the
extent to which, under the federal labor laws,24° union organizers
could come onto a shopping center parking lot to try and talk to
and organize workers at the main store in the shopping center.24 1
The opinion was written by Justice Thomas, 242 and it was one of
the first opinions he wrote.243 The Court was divided 6-3.244 He
took a very narrow view of the union organizers' rights. 2 45
The union organizers had been trying for months to organize
workers at the main retail store in a Connecticut shopping cen-
ter.246 When they sought to enter the center's parking lot to hand
out leaflets, the store refused to allow the activity, thus forcing
the organizers onto an area outside the parking lot entrance which
abutted a busy divided highway. 247 The NLRB ordered the em-
ployer to permit the union officials back onto the parking lot,24 8
but the Supreme Court overturned the Board's order.2 49
239. 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992).
240. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1989).
241. Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 843-44.
242. Id. at 843.
243. Prior to authoring Lechmere, Justice Thomas penned Molzof v. United
States, 112 S. Ct. 711 (1992), and filed a concurring opinion in White v.
Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992).
244. Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 850. The three dissenters were Justices White,
Blackmun, and Stevens.
245. Justice Thomas took a narrow view in construing what constitutes
"reasonable access" to employees by nonemployee union organizers. Id. at
848-49. In his view, accommodation between employer's property rights and
the right of the unions to disseminate information for purposes of organizing
unions occurs "so long as nonemploye union organizers have reasonable
access to employees outside an employer's property." Id. at 848. Thus, an
employer's property rights should not yield simply because nontrespassory
access to employees is "cumbersome or less than ideally effective." Id. at 849.
246. Id. at 844.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 844-45.
249. Id.
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The Court basically said that the National Labor Relations
Act250 (N.L.R.A.) protects employees. 25 1 Justice Thomas made
a number of significant anti-union points. First, the National La-
bor Relations Act gives employees, and not others, the basic right
to organize. 252 Second, where employees want to use employer
premises and property for protected organizing activities, a bal-
ancing and accommodation of rights must be undertaken. 253
Third, where access by non-employees is concerned, if such per-
sons have reasonable access to employees outside an employer's
property, the employer is privileged to deny permission to come
onto the premises. 254 Finally, only where such access is not fea-
sible must there be a balancing process. 255 Finding that off-
premise access was easily available, the Court held in favor of
the employer and against the NLRB. 256
Thus, neither the First Amendment nor the N.L.R.A. provide
an effective right of access to private property for speech pur-
poses. The Act does not directly protect union organizers. 257
They are protected as necessary to help the employees assert their
rights under the statute. 25 8 Here, no employees were seeking to
gain access to the parking lot in order to speak. Access to work-
ers will be permitted on private property only where there are
isolated locations, 2 59 like logging camps or farms. 260 Except for
250. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1989).
251. Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 845.
252. Id. at 846.
253. Id. at 848 (citing NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105,
113 (1956)).
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 849-50.
257. Id. at 845.
258. Id.
259. See Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 544-45 (1972)
(property rights of employers may be temporarily "yielded" when "alternative
channels of communication" between nonemployee union organizers and
isolated employees are nonexistent); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351
U.S. 105, 113 (1956) (employer is under no obligation to allow nonemployee
union organizers on his property absent showing by union that employees'
place of employment or homes place them "beyond the reach of reasonable
union efforts to communicate with them").
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those situations, private property is private property. If that
means the union organizers have to stand out by the edge of the
highway and hand out their literature as people drive in and out
of the parking lot, that is the price one pays for protecting private
property. 261 This was an anti-union kind of decision, and it re-
jected claims of speech rights in a statutory setting.
Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement
The final time, place, and manner case is Forsyth County v.
Nationalist Movement. 262 It really deals with an old chestnut kind
of issue, a parade permit ordinance.263 The setting was rural
Georgia, an atmosphere filled with racial tension.264 To protest
the troubled racial history of rural Forsyth County, Georgia,
there was a small civil rights demonstration in 1987. 265 The pro-
testers chose that area because at the turn of the century there had
been a mass expulsion of all the black citizens living in that
community. 266 The town from that point on had been 99%
white.2 67
Civil rights protesters went to the county to hold their
march. 268 They were met with five times as many counter-dem-
onstrators who yelled racial epithets and threw rocks, and the
260. Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 846; Babcock, 351 U.S. at 112-13.
261. Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 846.
262. 112 S. Ct. 2395 (1992).
263. See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
264. Forsyth, 112 S. Ct. at 2398-99.
265. Id. The demonstration was held on January 17, 1987 and was entitled
"March Against Fear and Intimidation." Id. at 2398.
266. During one month in 1912, the entire black population was
systematically driven from Forsyth County. Id. at 2398 n. 1. The expulsion
followed the murder of a white woman and the lynching of the accused black
murderer. Id.
267. The 1910 census calculated 1,098 African Americans in Forsyth
County. Through 1987, 99% of the population of the county remained white.
Id. at 2398 n.1 (citing Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Negro
Population 1790-1915, at 779 (1918)).
268. Id.
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march had to retreat. 2 69 Determined not to be intimidated, the
civil rights marchers returned the following weekend and brought
20,000 friends with them, which turned out to be the largest civil
rights march in the south since the 1960s.270
Protecting the competing groups from one another cost the lo-
cal government $670,000.271 In response, the county passed an
ordinance 2 72 providing that in order to have a parade, marchers
must obtain a parade permit and the county could charge a fee up
to $1,000 per day for the activity to help defray the cost of
maintaining order.273
A right-wing group called the Nationalist Movement challenged
this parade fee. 274 The Nationalist Movement sought a parade
permit to hold a rally protesting the Martin Luther King, Jr. fed-
eral holiday. 275 The county imposed a $100 permit fee which the
Movement refused to pay. 276 Even though they were told they
would only have to pay $100,277 the law permitted a fee of up to
$1,000 so the Nationalist Movement officers were allowed to
challenge the law on its face. 278
The question raised goes back to cases forty or fifty years ago,
cases like Cox v. New Hampshire279 and Murdoch v. Pennsylva-
nia,280 about whether the government can require a permit, li-
269. The marchers were met by the Forsyth County Defense League, the
Ku Klux Klan, and other residents. There were 400 counter-demonstrators. Id.
at 2398-99.
270. Id. at 2399.
271. Id.
272. Forsyth County, Ga. Ordinance 34 (Jan. 27, 1987 amended June 8,
1987).
273. Id.
274. Forsyth, 112 S. Ct. at 2400.
275. Id. at 2399.
276. Id. at 2400.
277. Id. at 2399.
278. Id. at 2400.
279. 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (upholding state law requiring parade permits).
280. 319 U.S. 105 (1943). In Murdoch, the Supreme Court held
unconstitutional a local ordinance which imposed upon religious colporteurs a
license tax as a condition to the pursuit of their activities. Id. at 117. The
Court constitutionally distinguished between an impermissible tax on the
exercise of a federal right and a proper regulatory measure to defray the
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cense, or fee in order to hold a demonstration. The basic answer
was what it was back then, yes. 281 The government can have a
permit or licensing scheme for marches, rallies and demonstra-
tions.282 The government may regulate competing uses of the
public forum via permit requirements. However, the licensing or
permit scheme must follow established guidelines to insure that
the decision is based on objective and neutral criteria and is not a
cover for suppression of unpopular groups and ideas. 283
What the ordinance cannot do is give the government official
unfettered discretion to determine the amount of the fee where
that determination is going to be based on a prediction of how
provocative the speaker's message will be, how likely there will
be a hostile reaction to that message, and therefore, how much it
is going to cost to maintain law and order. 284 The majority basi-
cally said the county can require the license, but it cannot give
the official discretion to decide what the message is, how pro-
vocative it is, what the counter-message is, how provocative that
will be, and how much police protection against reaction to the
ideas will cost.285 That particular statute was thrown out.2 86 The
First Amendment does not permit such a financial penalty on the
right to protest and communicate provocative or offensive
ideas. 287 To the argument that it was only $100 fee in that par-
ticular case, Justice Blackmun pithily responded, "a tax based on
expense of protecting citizens against the potential abuses of solicitors. Id. at
116-17.
281. Forsyth 112 S. Ct. at 2402-03; see also Cox, 312 U.S. at 576. Within
a municipality's authority to control the use of its public streets for parades or
processions is the authority to give nondiscriminatory consideration to time,
place, and manner in relation to other proper uses of the streets. Cox, 312 U.S.
at 576.
282. Cox, 312 U.S. at 574 (regulation of use of streets for parades and
processions is traditional exercise of control by local government); Forsyth,
112 S. Ct. at 2401.
283. Forsyth, 112 S. Ct. at 2403.
284. Id. at 2403-04.
285. Id. at 2405.
286. Id.
287. Id.
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the content of speech does not become more constitutional be-
cause it is a small tax.-288
The four dissenters289 thought it was all a bit of a tempest in a
teapot. It had not even been clear that there was that much dis-
cretion to say that one group had to pay up to $1,000 and another
group had to pay only $100.290 Since the Court felt a nominal
fee was clearly consistent with old cases on parade permits, 291
and since $100 was nominal, 292 there really was not any occasion
for the decision. 293 But the majority said whether or not fees of
this kind can be imposed, they cannot be imposed under a stan-
dardless, broad discretionary scheme of this kind. 294
Forsyth involved some very difficult issues of race and race
conflict in America - civil rights marchers, hostile audiences,
hostile marchers - and sort of set the stage, if you will, for the
two major cases of the Term, the two final cases I am going to
discuss - which dealt with very sensitive issues in our society295
and tested the Court's commitment to constitutional rights. The
Court passed the test, from my perspective.
R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul
The first of the last two cases I will discuss is R.A. V. v. City of
St. Paul.296 This case involved a crudely homemade cross that
was burned on the front lawn of a black family's home in St.
Paul about four or five years ago. 297 A number of teenagers were
288. Id.
289. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia, and Thomas.
290. Forsyth, 112 S. Ct. at 2399.
291. Id. at 2405 (finding the fee consistent with Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105 (1943) and Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941)).
292. Forsyth, 112 S. Ct. at 2405.
293. Id. at 2404-05.
294. Id. at 2403.
295. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (separation of church and
state); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (hate speech and
racism).
296. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
297. Id. at 2541.
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arrested following the incident. 29 8 Although several serious
criminal charges could have been brought against the youths, 29 9
instead they were charged under the local bias motivated crime
ordinance. 300 Well, the title is a misnomer because the ordinance
does not deal with enhanced punishment for traditional crimes
committed with biased motives. It basically outlawed biased
speech. The ordinance provided:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object,
appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not lim-
ited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or
has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resent-
ment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or
gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a mis-
demeanor. 30 1
It is undisputed that the ordinance was flatly unconstitu-
tional.302 The government is not allowed to outlaw speech that
simply arouses anger, alarm, or resentment in people. 303 The
Minnesota Supreme Court recognized that and construed the or-
dinance as only reaching biased, fighting words. 304 In other
words, the ordinance only prohibited bigoted messages dealing
with race, color, creed, religion, or gender in a manner which
inflicted injury or tended to incite immediate violence.305
298. Id.
299. They could have been charged with arson, terrorism, and trespass with
criminal intent. Id.
300. Id. at 2541; ST. PAUL, MINN. LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990).
301. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541; ST. PAUL, MINN. LEGIS. CODE § 292.02
(1990).
302. R.A. V. 112 S. Ct. at 2550. All of the Justices concurred in the
judgment, despite varying rationales for reaching this conclusion. Id. at 2541.
303. Id. at 2550; see United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 319 (1990);
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,
485 U.S. 46, 55-56 (1988); FCC v. Pacific Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745
(1978).
304. In re R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 510 (Minn. 1991), rev'd sub nom.
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (court narrowly
interpreted statute as applying only to Chaplinsky's"fighting words").
305. 464 N.W.2d at 510.
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In spite of this attempted surgery by the Minnesota Supreme
Court, the United States Supreme Court concluded that the ordi-
nance, even as narrowed, was fatally flawed. 306 The Supreme
Court unanimously threw out that hate speech statute. 307 Al-
though all nine Justices agreed with that result, 308 they bitterly
disagreed about the proper reasoning and doctrine to reach that
result.
I would first like to discuss concurring Justices White, Black-
mun, Stevens, and O'Connor. 30 9 They took a more modest and
traditional path to the result. They found that, despite the narrow-
ing interpretation by the Minnesota Supreme Court, the ordinance
could still be applied to hate messages that only caused hurt feel-
ings, offense or resentment.3 10 Since such speech is protected by
the First Amendment, the ordinance remained fatally overbroad
and invalid on its face. 3 11 However, these four Justices all took
the position that the particular hate message that was targeted to
the audience, and only those messages, could be outlawed under
a more carefully crafted enactment. 312
Justice Scalia, speaking for a five-Justice majority, 3 13 took a
bolder position. He said, "[a]ssuming, arguendo, that all of the
expression reached by the ordinance is proscribable under the
'fighting words' doctrine, we nonetheless conclude that the ordi-
nance is facially unconstitutional in that it prohibits otherwise
permitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech
addresses." 314 He based his conclusion on a number of prem-
306. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2550.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 2541. The opinion of the Court, written by Justice Scalia, was
joined by Justices Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Chief Justice Rehnquist.
Concurring opinions were filed by Justices White, Blackmun, and Stevens
joined by Justice O'Connor.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 2559-60 (White, J., concurring).
311. Id. (White, J., concurring).
312. Id. at 2554 (White, J., concurring).
313. Id. at 2541. The majority was composed of Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
Souter, Thomas, and Chief Justice Rehnquist.
314. Id. at 2542.
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ises. 315 He believed the core purpose of the First Amendment is
to prevent government from outlawing speech because of disap-
proval of the ideas expressed. 3 16
Justice Scalia stated that although certain categories of speech
can be regulated because of their content, 3 17 it does not mean
that once speech falls within those few disfavored categories it
can be regulated unconditionally, like garbage. 3 18 Rather, it
means that those areas of speech can be regulated consistently
with the First Amendment because of their constitutionally pro-
scribable content. 3 19 Justice Scalia concluded that it does not
mean that they are "categories of speech entirely invisible to the
Constitution, so that they may be made the vehicles for content
discrimination unrelated to their distinctively proscribable con-
tent." 320
Justice Scalia gave a number of examples of how this approach
was applied in decided as well as hypothetical cases. He noted
that although obscenity could be banned, it does not mean the
315. Justice Scalia began his opinion on the premise that government cannot
proscribe speech, or even expressive conduct, because it disapproves of the
ideas expressed. Id. at 2542. Content-based regulations are presumptively
invalid. Id. However, there are areas of speech which, consistent with the First
Amendment, can be regulated because of their proscribable content, such as
obscenity and defamation. Id. at 2543. Moreover, a particular instance of
speech can be proscribable on the basis of one content element, but not on
other content elements. Id. at 2544. Justice Scalia then noted that fighting
words are excluded from the First Amendment scope, but a government cannot
regulate their use based upon hostility or favoritism towards their underlying
message. Id. at 2545. Justice Scalia stated that the First Amendment imposes a
"content discrimination" limitation upon a state's prohibition of proscribable
speech. Id.
316. Id. at 2542.
317. E.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding
defamation actions brought against public officials must make a showing of
actual malice); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (upholding federal
obscenity statute punishing use of mails for obscene material); Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (holding fighting words were
not within First Amendment protections).
318. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2543.
319. Id.
320. Id.
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government could ban only obscenity that contains an anti-gov-
ernment message. 321 Furthermore, Justice Scalia explained that
flag burning could be punished under an ordinance against out-
door fires, but not under a flag "desecration" law. 322 Govern-
ment can regulate all noisy sound trucks, but not just noisy so-
cialist sound trucks. 323 Justice Scalia also applied the same prin-
ciple applied to the fighting words category: that there are unpro-
tected, nonspeech features to fighting words does not mean that
government has carte blanche to regulate some provocative ideas,
but not others. 324 Therefore, Justice Scalia reasoned, the First
Amendment imposes a kind of fallback "content discrimination"
limitation upon the state's prohibition even of proscribable
speech. 325 The purpose of this fallback protection is to ensure
"that there is no realistic possibility that official suppression of
ideas is afoot." 326 The "official suppression of ideas" is the core
evil against which the First Amendment was written. 327
Another example Justice Scalia gave was that "government may
proscribe libel; but it may not make the further content discrimi-
nation of proscribing only libel critical of the government." 328 In
other words, he viewed the First Amendment ban on censorship
and content discrimination as a limitation on any effort by the
state to pick and choose which messages would be allowed and
which would be proscribed even within an area where presump-
tively all of the messages are proscribable. 329 Applying this
principle to the St. Paul ordinance, Justice Scalia concluded that
even though the ordinance as construed was limited to fighting
words, it was only fighting words having to do with certain cate-
gories of bigotry that would lead to punishment under the stat-
321. Id. at 2543-44.
322. Id. at 2544.
323. Id. at 2545.
324. Id. at 2543-44.
325. See generally id. at 2544-47.
326. Id. at 2547.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 2543.
329. Id. at 2547.
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ute.330 If an individual uttered the most abusive and outrageous
words attacking a person's politics, sexual orientation or mother,
no crime had been committed under the ordinance. 331 It was only
if the individual uttered fighting words based on race, gender or
the other protected categories within the statute that an individual
could go to jail. 332 Justice Scalia viewed that as "viewpoint dis-
crimination. " 333 Such content differentiation is forbidden by the
First Amendment.334
Justice Scalia concluded that for that reason, "the First
Amendment [did] not permit St. Paul to impose special prohibi-
tions on those speakers who express views on disfavored sub-
jects." 335 Finally, Justice Scalia determined that the ordinance
also seemed to allow some fighting words if used to favor the
cause of tolerance, but not the cause of bigotry. 336 For example,
if a Klansman shouted a racial epithet at a black person, the ordi-
nance would be violated; if the black person responded by calling
the Klansman a "racist pig," the comment would be privi-
leged. 337 As the Court puts it: "St. Paul has no such authority to
license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the
other to follow Marquis of Queensbury Rules." 338 The Court
concluded that while the goal of protecting certain groups is
compelling, it does not need to be achieved by suppressing disfa-
vored offensive ideas. 339
When the doctrinal dust had settled, the Court had ruled, per-
haps not surprisingly, that the same First Amendment that pro-
tects flag burning protects cross burning.340 In both cases, the
330. Id. at 2547-48.
331. Id.
332. id.
333. Id.
334. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
335. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2547.
336. Id. at 2547-48.
337. Id. at 2548.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 2550.
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ideas conveyed are hateful; however, the Court reasoned that is
precisely why they cannot be outlawed and must be protected. 34 1
The concurring Justices charged the majority with unnecessarily
unsettling established First Amendment doctrine. 342 Since the
entire category of fighting words can generally be punished, tar-
geting only a subset of that prohibitable category was no less
valid. 343 There was no value to messages of racial hatred, and
the government was entitled to determine that fighting words
containing such messages are more problematic, blameworthy
and prohibitable than other kinds of hateful speech. 34 4
Let me just briefly note a couple of important implications of
the St. Paul hate speech case. First, numerous similar laws and
ordinances throughout the country will have to be revised in or-
der to pass muster under the new ruling. 345 Localities will now
have to deal with cross burning and other deplorable actions via
arson, assault and battery laws, or other traditional criminal laws.
Beyond that, localities will have to choose between repealing hate
speech crimes or expanding their topical scope.
Second, the case impacts on speech codes on public university
and college campuses. 346 To the extent such provisions only
prohibit some kinds of extremely provocative speech, they will
be defective under the majority's approach. Moreover, to the ex-
tent such speech codes punish expression that simply causes hurt
feelings, offense or resentment, they would probably fail, even
341. Id.
342. Id. at 2550-51 (White, J., concurring).
343. Id. at 2553 (White, J., concurring).
344. Id. at 2552, 2554 (White, J., concurring).
345. Some 30 states currently have anti-bias regulations. Hate Redux,
NAT'L L.J., Nov. 23 1992, at 7.
346. See, e.g., Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich.
1989) (university's policy held unconstitutionally overbroad and vague).
As many as 100 colleges and universities have speech codes and codes
of behavior dealing with racially and sexually motivated harassment.
Many of the laws are not as broad as the St. Paul ordinance; generally
they take existing crimes and enhance penalties if the crimes are
motivated by racial, religious or sex bias.
Don Terry, Rights Advocates Uncertain About Ruling's Impact, N.Y. TIMEs,
June 23, 1992, at A16.
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under the milder overbreadth approach of the concurring opin-
ions.347
Third, what is the fate of bias motivated crime provisions?
True bias-motivated laws, i.e., those that treat more seriously or
impose more severe punishment on regular crimes targeted
against members of certain groups, may still be valid. The Court
indicated that government could accord special protections to
harm directed at certain groups, just as long as it does not dis-
criminate against certain messages. 348 To be sure, proving such
bias-motivated crimes may pose problems in terms of intruding
into First Amendment interests, and some courts have even held
that the very concept of bias-motivated crime poses such prob-
lems. But the Court's opinion leaves the issue open for the fu-
ture. In New York if you threaten, attempt, or actually subject
someone to physical contact because they are black or Jewish,
you may get up to one year in jail.349 The New York aggravated
harassment statute prohibits violent conduct based solely on bias
towards certain groups of people. New York courts have upheld
these bias crime provisions under the First Amendment. 350
347. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2553-54 (White, J., concurring).
348. Id. at 2542.
349. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.31 (McKinney 1991). New York's aggravated
harassment in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor. The statute
provides: "A person is guilty of aggravated harassment in the second degree
when, with the intent to harass, annoy, threaten or alarm another person
he... strikes, shoves, kicks, or otherwise subjects another person to physical
contact or attempts to do the same because of the race[,] color, religion or
national origin of such person." Id. "A sentence of imprisonment for a class A
misdemeanor... shall not exceed one year...." N.Y. PENAL LAw, § 70.15
(McKinney 1991).
350. See, e.g., People v. Miccio, 589 N.Y.S.2d 762 (Crim. Ct. Kings
County 1992) (holding New York's aggravated harassment law does not
violate the First Amendment); People v. Rivera, 144 Misc. 2d 565, 569, 545
N.Y.S.2d 252, 254 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. County 1989) (holding New York's
aggravated harassment law does not operate to prohibit racial epithets, rather,
it prohibits only physical contact resulting from bias); People v. Grupe, 141
Misc. 2d 6, 8-9, 532 N.Y.S.2d 815, 817-18 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. County 1989)
(holding New York's aggravated harassment law regulates violent conduct
rather than violent speech); People v. Dinan, 118 Misc. 2d 857, 858, 461
N.Y.S.2d 724, 726 (Long Beach City Ct. 1983) (noting that freedom of
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The Supreme Court did not speak to these provisions directly.
However, there has been one intervening case since June from
Wisconsin3 5 1 where a 4-2 state supreme court threw out a bias
motivated felony statute35 2 on the basis of the St. Paul case. 353 It
found that the bias motivated statute simply punished bigoted
thoughts with which an assault is then committed, and that vio-
lated the First Amendment. 354 The Supreme Court has agreed to
hear that case, 355 so we will get an answer soon.
The final implication of the St. Paul case - and this is an im-
plication the Court did debate - is what it may do to hostile
environment sexual harassment rules in the workplace. 356 To
some extent, the rules single out only certain forms of bigoted
messages for prohibition. Are they now rendered suspect and
vulnerable under this decision? Justice Scalia went out of his way
to say that these rules were not called into question by the St.
Paul reasoning. 35 7 The concurring Justice was not persuaded it
was different. 358 If St. Paul cannot do what it did, how can
speech was not absolute and "must bend to satisfy the common good"
preventing harassment motivated by bigotry).
351. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807 (Wis. 1992).
352. Id. at 815.
353. Id.
354. Id. Lower court cases dealing with "bias crimes" in the wake of the
R.A.V. ruling include: Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807 (Wis.), cert.
granted, 113 S. Ct. 810 (1992); Ohio v. Wyant, 597 N.E.2d 450 (Ohio 1992),
petition for cert. filed, 61 U.S.L.W. 3303 (U.S. Sept. 29, 1992) (No. 92-
568); Oregon v. Plowman, 838 P.2d 558 (Or. 1992), petition for cert. filed,
(Nov. 23, 1992) (No. 92-6702).
355. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807 (Wis.), cert. granted, No.
92-515, 113 S. Ct. 810 (1992).
356. A claim for sexual harassment may be brought under the rubric of a
"hostile environment." Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-69
(1986). A hostile environment is considered sexual harassment under Title VII
and occurs when an employee encounters unwelcome sexual advances that
create an offensive or hostile work environment. Id. at 64. "Title VII affords
employees the right to work in an environment free from discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule and insult." Id. at 65 (citing 45 Fed. Reg. 74676 (1980);
Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957
(1972)).
357. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. at 2546-47.
358. Id. at 2557-58 (White, J., concurring).
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Congress impose special limitations on hostile environment
messages in the workplace? Obviously, these issues will have to
be played out in future cases.
Lee v. Weisman
The final case I am going to discuss was another case where the
issues were quite difficult, both doctrinally and politically. I am
speaking here, of course, of Lee v. Weisman,359 the graduation
prayer case.
This case was closely watched. 360 Other than the abortion
case3 6 1of which Janet Benshoof spoke, 362 this was probably the
next most closely-watched case of the Term in the area of First
Amendment, because it might have been a watershed moment in
the history of separation of church and state. The questions peo-
ple worried about were: would the decision lower the wall of
separation; would the Court relax its concerns with religious dis-
senters who opposed the majority's efforts to embroil government
with religion; would the Court use the case as the occasion to
359. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
360. Daniel S. Hamilton, A Minority Rules, N.Y. NEWSDAY, July 12,
1992, at 54 (stating that only minority of Americans support Supreme Court's
decision in Lee v. Weisman); Dick Lehr, Centrist Troika Slows the Right on
High Court, BOSTON GLOBE, July 3, 1992, at 1 (evidenced by its Case and
Weisman decisions, Supreme Court is not on runaway right-wing cause that
conservatives and liberals alike had predicted); Douglas E. Mirell, Supreme
Court on School Prayer, L.A. TMIES, July 24, 1992, at B6, col. 5 (agreeing
with Justice Kennedy in Lee v. Weisman that Constitution was designed to give
responsibility of preservation of religious belief to private sphere); Letter to
the Editor from Lew Petterson, Roger Williams Would Have Said "Amen" to
School Prayer Ban, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1992, § 4, at 20, col. 4 (founder of
Massachusetts, Roger Williams, would have praised decision in Lee .
Weisman because he left Massachusetts to escape religious persecution);
Samuel Rabinove, In Prayer Case, the Supreme Court Kept History in Mind,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, July 6, 1992, at 19 (although majority of
people want school-sponsored prayer on voluntary basis, as polls prove,
Supreme Court properly adhered to historical intent which shows that First
Amendment was designed to protect minorities).
361. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2781 (1992).
362. Janet Benshoof, Pennsylvania Abortion Case, 9 TouRo L. REv. 217
(1993).
1993] 295
TOURO LAWREVIEW
change its much criticized formula for judging whether any par-
ticular government support for religion is permissible. 363
In Weisman, middle schools and high schools in Providence,
Rhode Island were permitted to invite members of the clergy to
offer invocation and benediction prayers as part of its graduation
ceremonies. 364 School officials conferred with clergy members to
determine the proper nonsectarian content of the prayers. 365 Pur-
suant to that custom, a rabbi gave an invocation and benediction
at a middle school graduation ceremony. 366 The prayers referred
to a deity at several points. 367 Deborah Weisman, a middle
school graduate, objected to the religious aspect of the ceremony,
but she and her family attended. They sued to try to prevent such
religious participation in the future. 36 8
Writing for a 5-4 Court, Justice Kennedy observed that the is-
sues in the case could be resolved without revisiting the broad
and difficult questions of the extent to which government may or
must "accommodate" the religious beliefs and practices of its
citizens. 369 Nor did the Court have to reconsider its three-part
formula for determining whether governmental aid or support for
religion violated the Establishment Clause.370 That formula, you
will recall, asks whether the challenged program reflects a clearly
secular purpose, whether its primary effect neither advances nor
inhibits religion, and whether it promotes excessive entanglement
363. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971); infra notes
370-71 and accompanying text.
364. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2652.
365. Id. It has been the custom of Providence school officials to provide
invited clergy with a pamphlet entitled 'Guidelines for Civic Occasions,'
prepared by the National Conference of Christians and Jews. The Guidelines
recommend that public prayers at nonsectarian civic ceremonies be composed
with "inclusiveness and sensitivity," though they acknowledge that "[p]rayer
of any kind might be inappropriate on some civic occasions."
Id.
366. Id. at 2652-53.
367. Id.
368. See 728 F. Supp. 68 (D.R.I. 1990).
369. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2655.
370. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1.
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between church and state.3 7 1 Rather, the Court noted that this
was a school prayer case, and a special vigilance has marked the
Court's cases in the area of permissible religious practices in
primary and secondary schools, and those controlling precedents
make clear that prayers at graduation are unconstitutional. 372
In Providence, there was pervasive government involvement
with religious activity to the point that school officials directed
the form the prayers should take. 373 However, the government's
obligation to honor individual free exercise of religion does not
supersede the fundamental limits of the Establishment Clause.374
At a minimum, the Court stated, "government may not coerce
anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise." 375
The objecting student was effectively forced into participating in
a religious ceremony in order to attend her school graduation. 376
As the Court stated, "[t]he Constitution forbids the State to exact
religious conformity from a student as the price of attending her
own high school graduation. This is the calculus the Constitution
commands."377
Even though the prayer was a nonsectarian invocation and
benediction given at a graduation ceremony by, in this case, a
rabbi,378 the Supreme Court essentially said whether the prayer
was nonsectarian or preferential was not relevant. 379 What mat-
tered here was that the school officials got in the business of re-
371. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
372. See also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (striking state statute
authorizing moment of silence for meditation or voluntary prayer); Abington
Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (striking state statute requiring
biblical passages on prayers to be recited despite provision for student
exemption via written request of parents); Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962) (striking state statute requiring official denominationally neutral prayer
despite provisions for nonparticipation of student objectors).
373. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2652, 2656.
374. Id. at 2655.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 2660.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 2652.
379. Id. at 2656.
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ligion. 380 They told the rabbi what the prayers should sound like,
what areas they ought to stay away from, and those prayers were
offered as part of the ceremony. 38 1 The ceremony was only vol-
untary in the strict sense of the term because high school gradu-
ations are important in young people's lives. 382 The Court
analogized the prayer at the graduation ceremony to prayer in the
classroom, 3 83 and found that the rights of the dissenters had to be
respected. 3 84
That opinion was written by Justice Kennedy. It is exhibit three
or four in my case that he has become quite a vigorous champion
of First Amendment rights. 385 Other issues about religious ob-
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 2556.
383. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668 (1984); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963);
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
384. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2660-61.
385. Justice Kennedy is emerging as one of the most vigorous proponents of
the First Amendment. His zeal is evidenced by his stance in Simon & Schuster
where he criticized the Court for relying on the compelling government
interest test, which, in his view, has been "adopted by accident rather than the
result of considered judgment." 112 S. Ct. 501, 513 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). This test, he explained, "has no real or legitimate place" where
the content itself is afforded full protection under the First Amendment, id. at
512 (Kennedy, J., concurring), because use of this test to regulate based on
content would therefore be permissible "if confined in a narrow way to serve a
compelling state interest." Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 1858 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring). The result, Justice Kennedy feared, would produce
"a misunderstanding that has the potential to encourage attempts to suppress
legitimate expression" in direct contravention of First Amendment guarantees.
Id.
Justice Kennedy also sought to redefine public forums in order to encompass
those forums which fall outside the traditional categorization of "streets, parks
and sidewalks." Krishna 2, 112 S. Ct. 2711, 2716-17 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). Justice Kennedy found error in the fact that the Court's
designation of public property as a public forum rested solely on the
"government's defined purpose for the property, or on explicit decision by the
government to dedicate the property to expressive activity," id. at 2716
(Kennedy, J., concurring), rather than an objective inquiry which had as its
focal point the "actual, physical characteristics and uses of the property." Id.
(Kennedy, J., concurring). One of the purposes of the First Amendment is to
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servance in public places other than public schools will have to be
revisited in future Terms, but so far as prayers at graduation are
concerned, they are beyond constitutional pale.
I would like to make a couple of final points about that case.
Justice Souter wrote a concurring opinion that took a very strong
separationist position.3 86 He made two points I think will be im-
portant in future cases beyond the school setting. First, the Es-
tablishment Clause, which says that "government shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion," 387 guards against
state sponsorship of nonsectarian messages no less than state
sponsorship of messages that are more explicitly preferential to-
ward one religion as against another. 388 His view seems to be
that the First Amendment is designed to prevent government
from favoring any religion and not just from favoring certain re-
ligions. 3 89
Similarly, government endorsement of religion violates the Es-
tablishment Clause, regardless of whether anyone is coerced in
prevent government control over freedom of expression. Id. (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). According to Justice Kennedy, however, the essential purpose
will be frustrated by "the failure to recognize... that new types of property
may be appropriate forums for speech" and will lead to "serious curtailment of
our expressive activity." Id. at 2717 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
386. Separationists believe that a state must neither provide religious
entities with financial support other than that bestowed upon the general
populous nor "symbolically endorse any religion in any way." Richard H.
Jones, Acomodationist and Separationist Ideals in Supreme Court
Establishment Clause Decisions, 28 J. CHURCH AND ST. 193, 194 (1986). The
views of Justice Souter endorse this notion that "religion is a matter which lies
solely between a man and his God." Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,
164 (1878) (citing a letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist
Association). His concurring opinion in Lee v. Weisman represents a strict
construction of the Establishment Clause. 112 S. Ct. at 2667 (Souter, J.,
concurring). See also Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1947)
(Rutledge, J., dissenting) (purpose of Establishment Clause is to "create a
complete and permanent separation of the spheres of religious activity and civil
authority by comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or support
for religion").
387. U.S. CONST. amend I, el. 1.
388. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2667 (Souter, J., concurring).
389. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
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violation of their own beliefs. 39° Otherwise, the Establishment
Clause would be a nullity, since the Free Exercise Clause already
prohibits government coercion of individual beliefs. 391 His basic
message, in general, was that government may not benefit or fa-
vor religion, except in those rare cases where that is imperative in
order to ease severe burdens on religious freedom. 3 92 Govern-
ment endorsement of religion by having a religious figure at a
public ceremony is a violation of the Establishment Clause,
whether or not it offends any particular person's beliefs, or
whether or not it coerces any particular person's beliefs. 393
Therefore, the Establishment Clause is an independent check on
government support for religion, even if that support does not
violate some person's free exercise rights. 394
Justice Scalia dissented, speaking for Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices White and Thomas. 395 First, he basically accused
Justice Kennedy of altering his views because he cited a 1989
opinion396 where Justice Kennedy seemed to take a more ac-
commodating position on the right of government to acknowledge
religion in ceremonial occasions. 397 So viewed, history has vali-
dated the general role of nonsectarian prayers at public events and
ceremonies, and the specific tradition of such prayers in public
390. Id. at 2671 (Souter, J., concurring).
391. Id. at 2673 (Souter, J., concurring).
392. Id. at 2676-77 (Souter, J., concurring).
393. Id. at 2678 (Souter, J., concurring).
394. See Mary Harter Mitchell, Secularism in Public Education: The
Constitutional Issues, 67 B.U. L. REV. 603, 657 (1987) (explaining that "the
establishment clause should be available as a check against noncoercive
government influences"); but see Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble With
Accommodation, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 743, 761 (1992) (reliance on Free
Exercise Clause to defeat Establishment Clause claims "become[s] a
springboard for power instead of a check upon it").
395. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2678 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
396. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492
U.S. 573 (1989)).
397. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2678. In County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Justice
Kennedy wrote that "Government policies of accommodation, acknowledg-
ment, and support for religion are an accepted part of our political and cultural
heritage." 492 U.S. at 657.
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school graduations. 39 8 That being so, there was no warrant for
outlawing the practices in this case. 399 Classroom prayers might
be another matter; but no one here was coerced in any real way
into participating in a religious ceremony. 40 0 Finally, this is not a
case where the Constitution clearly mandates subordinating the
majority's wishes to the minority's sensitivities. 401 Justice
Scalia's position on the merits was that tradition plays an impor-
tant role in these cases. 402 Justice Scalia stated that if there has
generally been a tradition of religious mentioning or commentary
at public events, 40 3 and if there has specifically been a tradition
of offering nonsectarian prayers at public school events, then in
the face of that tradition, the Court was wrong to read the First
Amendment as requiring the contrary. 40 4
However, that was just a dissent. The majority, of course,
held, as I mentioned, that the preferences of the majority had to
yield to the rights of the individual. 40 5 That is also what they did
in the hate speech case. I think in that way, it was a good year
for First Amendment interests. In deciding these two cases, the
Court was faithful to its deepest principles and loyal to its finest
traditions. Moreover, the re-affirmation of those principles of
protecting individual rights against majoritarian demands could
not have come at a more vital moment for the First Amendment.
In recent years, the threats to freedom of speech have come from
unexpected directions. Professor Kathleen Sullivan of the Har-
vard Law School describes the unusual phenomenon as follows:
Old-fashioned free speech libertarians were always sure who the
enemy was: government wielding the awesome power of the
state. But some groups left of center now challenge this age-old
demonology. Threats to true free speech, they say, may come as
398. Weisman, at 2679-80 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
399. See id. at 2678-79 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
400. Id. at 2684-85 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
401. Id. at 2686 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
402. Id. at 2678-79 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
403. See id. at 2679 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Engle v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421, 435 n.21 (1962).
404. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2686 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
405. Id. at 2661.
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much from private power as from the state. The influence of
money skews political campaigns. A subtle reign of racist, sexist
and homophobic verbal terror silences minorities on college
campuses. And pornography represents the boot of man on
woman's neck, stifling any voice that might talk back. The solu-
tion? See the government as a savior rather than a bogeyman;
see the state not as a sword but a shield. Enact regulations to si-
lence the voices of the powerful in order that the silenced may be
heard. Government has long redistributed bargaining power in
economic markets. Now, the critics say, it's time to redistribute
speaking powers in the marketplace of ideas. 40 6
Hopefully, the First Amendment will prove able to resist these
post-modem assaults as it has resisted other attacks in the past.
Thank you.
IV. AUTHOR'S POSTSCRIPT
The election of President Bill Clinton will give vent in a serious
way to many of these attempts to "redistribute" free speech and
thereby will provide a critical crucible to test our commitment to
First Amendment values. For the first time in over a decade, we
will have one-party rule in Washington, 40 7 and governing ma-
jorities will have a clear field to enact laws which restrict free
speech in order to serve the "needs of the community." On three
vital fronts, we are likely to see major clashes between "reform,"
legislation and First Amendment values.
406. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The First Amendment Wars, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, Sept. 28, 1992, at 35, 35-36. Professor Sullivan goes on, very
effectively, to restate the case for respecting the First Amendment. Id.
407. The 1992 Presidential election was won by the Democrats. The Senate
is currently composed of 57 Democrats and 43 Republicans. The House of
Representatives is currently composed of 258 Democrats, 176 Republicans,
and 1 Independent. 1 Cong. Index (CCH) 10, 101, 24, 151 (1993) (calculating
number of representatives from each House of Congress in the 103rd
Congress).
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First, candidate Clinton, speaking to a B'Nai Brith convention,
endorsed a federal "bias-motivated crime" bill,408 introduced by
Representative Charles Schumer, which would sharply increase
sentences for crimes "motivated" by bigotry. As one commenta-
tor has noted, the Schumer bill, which is opposed by the ACLU,
goes out of its way to punish opinions rather than conduct. In-
stead of defining hate crimes as a substantive criminal offense
(which would have to be proved at trial), the bill requires federal
judges to conduct an inquisition into a criminal's thoughts and
beliefs at the sentencing stage, after he has already been con-
victed. This poses an unusual threat to civil liberties: in a sen-
tencing hearing, all the procedural protections that apply at trial
go out the window. 409
Despite these serious constitutional flaws, a strong push for this
bill can be expected.
Also pending in Congress is a "Pornography Victims' Compen-
sation" 410 bill that would permit damage awards against pub-
lishers if their readers later commit sexual crimes. 4 11 The theory
of the bill, unprecedented in First Amendment doctrine, has been
soundly rejected by lower courts. But Congress may try to say
otherwise.
Finally, President Clinton is a staunch supporter of "political
reform" measures to reduce the influence of "special interests"
by, among other things, restricting campaign financing and im-
posing controls on lobbying activities. 412 That has long been a
high priority on the liberal agenda, despite the pervasive and se-
vere First Amendment problems posed by any effort to have
government control and "reform" the political process and
thereby tamper with political speech. These reform proposals
typically impose a variety of conditions, restrictions, and blan-
408. H.R. 4797, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (Hate Crimes Sentencing
Enhancement Act).
409. Crime and Punishment, THE NEw REPUBLIC, Oct. 12, 1992, at 7.
410. S. 2186-02, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (Pornography Victims
Compensation Act).
411. Id.
412. Gwen Ifill, Team Issues 5-Year Lobby Ban, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 10,
1992, at A19.
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dishments in an effort to control campaign funding and activity,
and penalize those candidates who refuse to comply. 4 13 Were the
goal to expand political opportunity, reform might be valid. But
pending proposals are always linked to limits on campaign ex-
penditures, and limits on campaign expenditures in the long run
always inure to the benefits of incumbents. While campaign con-
trols will make it more difficult to control and defeat incumbents
at election time, controls on lobbyists will make it harder to con-
trol incumbent politicians between elections as well. Both kinds
of "reforms" will clearly be in the legislative hopper.
Against these potential onslaughts, free speech stalwarts will
have two lines of defense. First, the task will be to try to per-
suade governing majorities that it is a breach of First Amendment
faith to try to remedy short-term problems with long-term re-
pressions of free speech. But should that strategy fail, the second
and last line of defense will be the Supreme Court. At troubled
times in our history, the Court has been asked to choose between
the will of the majority and the rights of the minority and to de-
termine where the Constitution requires the proper boundary be
set. We may be entering another such era. The Constitution
seems to speak with particular insistence to the present political
setting: "Congress shall make no law .... " With this injunction
and the strong First Amendment precedents that this past Term
has put on the books, we will be well armed for whatever battles
lie ahead.
413. S. 6417, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (Congressional Campaign
Spending Limit and Election Reform of 1992).
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